Copan - Longman III - Reese - Strauss - Dictionary of Christianity and Science

Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2017. – 704 p.

ePub ISBN 978-0-310-49606-9

 

Biblical faith and science have been allies and combatants throughout Western history. From Copernicus’s heliocentric model to Blaise Pascal’s meditations on the mysteries of God, from Darwin’s agnosticism to school board disputes over intelligent design, conversation between the two has been both fraught with emotion and fruitful for exploration. Today various scientific theories and discoveries continue to raise questions for Christian views of cosmology, anthropology, and philosophy—and for Bible study and public witness. Possibly more than at any other time in history, views about the relationship between science and Christianity in Western culture are both polarizing and confusing. Thus reasonable dialogue about the intersection of these two topics and clarification of their respective concepts and implications is essential.

 

The Dictionary of Christianity and Science is just such a contemporary investigation of the interaction between Christian faith and science. It is not meant to be exhaustive—much more could be written about each of its entries—but it is wide ranging and accessible. Virtually all of the contributors are evangelical Christians who are experts in their respective fields of study. All entries have been thoroughly peer reviewed by the general editors. It is our hope that the Dictionary ’s readers will be informed and challenged throughout by accurate summaries and even-handed analysis.

 

Evangelical Christianity does not have a shared mind regarding science. Well-established camps, often with their own publications, organizations, and events, disagree on fundamental issues. While no book can claim perfect objectivity, the aim of this volume is to represent various evangelical camps and viewpoints as fairly as possible on their own terms. Such an approach will not please everyone. Readers who would prefer settled conclusions might be disappointed. Yet the goal of this dictionary is to chart the outlines of evangelical thought on science and to suggest a framework for future discussions, not to bring such discussions to an end.

 

This dictionary contains three types of entries.

 

Introductions. These shorter pieces outline the central facts about a topic in summary form. Where interpretive questions exist, simple explanations of the most viable options are presented, with equal treatment given to each option. The goal of Introductions is a quick and easily grasped overview.

 

Essays. These longer entries begin with the same information as the Introductions entries but include further exploration of the implications and significance of the topic under discussion. References to important figures or works related to the topic are often included, as is relevant supporting information. The goal of Essays is a thorough introductory synopsis of a consequential subject.

 

Multiple-View Discussions. Unlike other entries in the Dictionary , Multiple-View Discussions are not meant to be dispassionate. Instead, on key subjects that have stimulated ongoing disagreement and have bearing on the broader relationship between Christian and scientific thought, representatives of significant viewpoints have written pieces that vigorously yet charitably propose their point of view. Argumentation against and anticipation of opposing views’ critiques are included. It should be noted that the viewpoint authors did not read one another’s entries prior to publication. These viewpoint pieces rely on current research and attempt to present other views accurately, yet the thrust of each piece is to persuade rather than merely to inform. The goal of Multiple-View Discussions is a debate that delineates the different viewpoints, better equipping readers to come to their own well-informed conclusions. As such, the general editors do not agree with all of the views expressed in these articles. Instead, the editors have tried to promote accuracy but have allowed for a principled dialogue of viewpoints even when controversial. At times there is a fine line between accuracy and opinion.

 

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HIDDENNESS OF GOD

 

According to various skeptics about God’s existence, including Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion , the claim that God exists must be evaluated along the lines of a typical scientific hypothesis. If, however, God is a personal agent who has redemptive purposes in hiding from people at times, we are not dealing with a typical scientific hypothesis in the claim that God exists. Instead, we are dealing with a claim about a unique personal agent who is no scientific object but is intentionally elusive at times and nonetheless worthy of worship.

 

The Jewish-Christian God does not appear constantly in the awareness of people, because this God avowedly hides from people at times. The book of Isaiah announces, “Truly you are a God who has been hiding himself, the God and Savior of Israel” (Isa. 45:15). A similar theme recurs in the Psalms; for instance, the psalmist asks God: “Why do you hide your face and forget our misery and oppression?” (Ps. 44:24). Jesus himself picks up the theme of divine hiding regarding the things of his own ministry, and gives thanks to God for this hiding: “Jesus said, ‘I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and learned, and revealed them to little children’ ” (Matt. 11:25; Luke 10:21). In a similar vein, the apostle Paul speaks of God’s “hidden wisdom,” specifically the treasures of God’s wisdom “hidden” in Christ (see 1 Cor. 2:7; Col. 2:3). We should hesitate, then, to suggest that God is constantly obvious to all people.

 

Some philosophers of religion have identified a “problem” of divine hiddenness; they ask whether a perfectly loving God could fail to be self-revealed in a manner that removes all reasonable human doubt about God’s reality. Some of these philosophers hold that perfect love would preclude God’s hiding from humans in a way that leaves reasonable human doubt about God’s existence. If they are right, one must face the consideration that God’s existence is not beyond reasonable doubt according to many normal adult humans. According to these humans, we may reasonably deny that God exists or at least refrain from believing that God exists.

 

A consideration about divine hiddenness, then, can figure in a case for atheism or at least agnosticism. It seems, however, that God’s hiding from some people does not entail either God’s hiding from everyone always or everyone’s lacking adequate evidence for God’s existence; nor does God’s hiding entail anyone’s lacking available evidence for God’s existence, beyond the evidence one actually has. Evidence of God’s existence can be variable among persons in a way that the truth about God’s existence is not. One reason for this variability is straightforward: people can have different experiences regarding God, including with different degrees of salience.

 

Some philosophers offer the freedom response to the problem of divine hiddenness. This response, suggested by John Hick (2010) and others, implies that God would hide at least to some extent to enable people freely to love, trust, and obey God, that is, to avoid the divine coercion of humans. The key idea is that if God self-revealed without any hiding, humans would be overwhelmed in a way that extinguishes their free response to God. This response, however, raises a question: could not God supply a less elusive or less obscure self- revelation without extinguishing human freedom in responding to that revelation? It seems so, according to many people. A self-revelation of God with a bit more clarity or salience would seem not to overwhelm people by removing freedom from their response. If this is so, and it does seem plausible, the freedom response will not serve as a full response to the problem of divine hiddenness.

 

Some philosophers offer the proper-motivation response to the problem of divine hiddenness. This response, suggested by Blaise Pascal (2008) and others, implies that God would hide to avoid, or at least to reduce the likelihood of, a human reply to God from improper motives, such as selfish fear or pride. According to this response, God’s self-revelation without hiding would prompt humans to have selfish fear or pride in their response. God would hide, however, to discourage such fear and pride, because such fear and pride do not fit with the kind of human moral character sought by God. But this response prompts a simple question: could not God supply a less elusive or less obscure self-revelation without eliciting improper motives in a human response to that revelation? It seems so, in the view of many people. A bit more clarity in God’s self-revelation would seem not to require human fear and pride; or, at least, one would need to make a good case for a contrary position. If this is so, we cannot offer the proper-motivation response as a full response to the problem of divine hiddenness.

 

The divine-purposes response implies that God would restrain divine self-revelation, at least for a time, to at least some humans to enhance the satisfaction of various perfectly loving purposes which God has for humans. This response, suggested in some of my own writings (Moser 2008, 2010), allows that the amount and the kind of God’s self-revelation can vary among people, and the variation can result from God’s perfectly loving purposes for recipients of the revelation. If these purposes are perfectly loving, God can be perfectly loving in giving varied and elusive self-revelation to humans. The exact details of God’s purposes could sometimes be unclear to us, as we should expect given God’s transcendent cognitive superiority relative to us. Even when unclear on the details of divine purposes, however, one could know and reasonably trust the God who hides for a time, if God has lovingly intervened elsewhere in one’s experience with adequate evidence. So, a general argument for atheism or agnosticism will not find a foothold here, contrary to Schellenberg (2006) and some others.

 

If God is truly redemptive toward humans, in seeking their well-being (all things considered), then we should expect God’s self-revelation to come with redemptive purposes for humans. We should not expect this self-revelation to be just an intellectual matter, as if God aimed merely to prompt humans to believe that God exists. Instead, we should expect God’s self-revelation to encourage people to cooperate with God, in loving God fully, above all else, and in loving others as God loves them, even one’s enemies. Such cooperation from humans would be a fitting response to a God who is worthy of worship and hence self-sufficiently morally perfect. It would also enable human fellowship with God, in reconciliation to God, and thereby restore humans from their alienation from God. In that regard, human cooperation with God would be curative for humans, relative to human spiritual sickness (see Mark 2:17).

 

A problem faced by a redemptive God is that many people are not ready or willing to enter into cooperation with God. Their own commitments and plans interfere with such cooperation, and they are aware of this, sometimes painfully (cf. Mark 10:17–27). As a result, God may decide to hide from them for a time, so as not to deepen their antipathy to God or the purposes of God. The problem concerns a refusal to follow Jesus in Gethsemane, where he yielded his will to God, even when death was the result. This is more than an intellectual problem; it goes to who one is as a volitional agent before God. As redemptive, God chooses to bob and weave toward humans, looking for a curative opportunity. Accordingly, God is not like the nonpersonal objects of the sciences. God has profound redemptive purposes, and they account for divine hiding, even when humans, like Job, are unable to comprehend those purposes. Cognitive modesty, then, is the order of the day in the area of divine hiddenness.

 

Paul K. Moser

 

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